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Introduction 
I expect that at a certain age everyone comes to think they are living in a time of great 
political upheaval. Things change, and when they do or appear to be about to, people who are 
uncomfortable with a particular change or just uncomfortable with change full stop think that the 
life they have known and come to love cannot possibly continue if these changes come to pass or 
are not immediately reversed. In most cases, the real reason they think this is simply a particularly 
volatile combination of paranoia and lack of imagination. But not in all cases, which is why this 
kind of thinking is impossible to suppress. And I have to admit that I am worried. I am worried 
about the kind and degree of economic dislocation we are currently seeing; about the xenophobia, 
isolationism, and undemocratic attitudes that seem to be inexorably on the rise in supposedly well-
established liberal democratic societies; about the growing vitality and mainstream appeal of 
extremist parties and candidates that had long been long thought of as being on the isolatable 
fringe; about the kind of race-based and religious violence that we are seeing everywhere in the 
world today; and about the lack of persuasive power that facts seem to hold in debates about public 
policy today while emotions run so hot and deep they are leading us to forget where our best 
interests lie or, even worse, encouraging us to pursue what we may erroneously perceive as our 
best interests without regard for the common good. All this gives me a sense of déjà vu I cannot 
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shake that we are re-living the 1930s. Policies that we know will work from prior experience are 
being ignored or outright rejected with a contempt that is hard to reconcile with rational thought, 
while ideas that have proved not only wrong but dangerous time and time again seem to have a 
death-grip on those who are supposed to be guiding our response to the problems of the present. 
The net result of all this being that there is a populist pox arising on both established houses of 
political morality (the moderate left and the moderate right) and there is a real possibility that our 
lives could be handed over to autocrats and demagogues that cannot possibly make things any 
better and most likely will makes things dramatically worse.  
Of course, while the 1930s did not end well, history does not have to repeat itself. It is 
within our power to step back from the brink and not jump head-long into self-destruction once 
again. Indeed, there are many things that people of good faith can and should be doing to respond 
to the forces currently buffeting us throughout the world today. But I intend to talk about only one: 
what we as political philosophers should be doing if we are to contribute to the effort to ensure 
that things do not get any further out of hand. Not because I think that political philosophers have 
a uniquely important role to play here (it is important but not uniquely important), but because it 
is the role I have spent the most time thinking about, and because a shockingly large percentage 
of contemporary political philosophers seem to be utterly unwilling and perhaps even unable to 
attend to the job that society and history has assigned to them.  
In words of Isaiah Berlin, this lack of attention by political philosophers is both surprising 
and dangerous. “Surprising,” Berlin says,  
because there has, perhaps, been no time in modern history when so large a number 
of human beings, in both East and West, have had their notions, and indeed their 
lives, so deeply altered, and in some cases violently upset, by fanatically held social 
and political doctrines. (Berlin 2002a: 167) 
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And “dangerous,” he says,  
 
because when ideas are neglected by those who ought to attend to them—that is to 
say, those who have been trained to think critically about ideas—they sometimes 
acquire an unchecked momentum and irresistible power over multitudes of men 
and may grow too violent to be affected by rational criticism. (Berlin 2002a: 167)  
 
Berlin wrote this in 1958, and he was talking about the battle between liberal democracy and 
communism, but his words sound eerily apposite today, for the same overall phenomenon of 
philosophical neglect seems to be at work. Indeed, we could not have reached the precipice on 
which we now stand unless our education system in general and our profession in particular had 
not so blatantly failed to provide people with the tools to think rationally and critically about the 
various social and political choices currently being presented to them (see Robinson 2017).  
This does not mean, however, that I am claiming that “political philosophy is dead” as 
Peter Laslett famously did in 1956 (Laslett 1956) and Berlin himself queried pointedly in 1961 
(Berlin 1978).1 That claim was different—it was a based on the belief of a large part of the 
philosophical community that there was nothing important or even interesting left for political 
philosophers to do, a belief that was taken very seriously at the time but was ultimately proved 
false when John Rawls published A Theory of Justice in 1971 (Rawls 1971). Indeed, that book 
inspired such a flood of new, intellectually significant and topically relevant material that one 
could rightly marvel at how robustly the discipline had been resurrected (see generally Miller 
1990). But while the volume of this material has still not begun to subside, its intellectual 
significance and quality has been in serious decline since at least the beginning of this century.2 
New and important work is appearing less and less frequently, while the scope of most of the work 
that is now appearing is getting smaller and more internal and its practical applications more 
difficult to discern. The discipline has reached a point of intellectual stagnation, continuously 
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repeating itself or obsessing over less and less important topics or offering solutions that are only 
more infeasible than solutions that have already proved infeasible in the past. In short, the 
profession has been making itself inconsequential and irrelevant for quite some time, even though 
real-world developments suggest that the need for input from those trained in the methods and 
ideas about which political philosophers are supposed to have expertise could not be more critical. 
What follows then is a set of statements about how I believe that we, as political 
philosophers, should approach what we do, both within the academy and without (although there 
are an extremely limited number of opportunities to pursue this profession outside of the academy). 
It contains my view as to what political philosophy should be about, how political philosophy 
should be done, and how courses in political philosophy should be taught. It is designed to function 
as the basis of an introductory lecture in a course on political philosophy, but it is also designed to 
be more than that—to be a comment on the current state of the profession. Useful introductory 
material of the “What is Political Philosophy?” variety is surprisingly thin on the ground (I shall 
give a brief summary of what is out there in a moment), and commentary on the current state of 
the profession is non-existent. So, there is a definite gap here to be filled. Given my objectives, 
then, this piece is primarily normative, although it does make some descriptive claims along the 
way. The descriptive claims I make are based largely on my own experience—that is, based on 
anecdotal evidence, because few of the points I make about the current state of the profession have 
been the subject of formal study, and many are simply not subject to empirical proof one way or 
the other. Where there is more formalized empirical evidence available, however, I will cite it. 
And even where there is not I will rely on my own experience only when I believe it is widely 
shared. While I will not be able to fully develop and defend each of the claims I make here, I will 
spend a lot of time on the most controversial ones, and whenever possible I will also provide 
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references to other works where more extensive discussion can currently be found. In any event, I 
hope those interested in the profession will see that there are reasons to be troubled here and take 
this piece as presenting an agenda for how those worries might be taken on.  
One final introductory point. This piece is written in a style and a tone that might strike 
some as unusual for an article in an academic journal. It contains both argument and memoir, is 
intended not only for experienced scholars and upper-level students but also for students who have 
not previously encountered political philosophy, and uses language that is sometimes more 
colorful and personal than what has become conventional for works of this kind.3 But one of my 
arguments is that the current convention of maintaining a constrained style and dispassionate tone 
in political philosophy is arbitrary and, more importantly, that it is having a detrimental effect upon 
both the substance and the persuasive power of the work currently being generated by the 
profession. I intend to challenge this convention and argue that rather than being so relentlessly 
detached, political philosophers should (at least sometimes if not always) see themselves as what 
Ruth Behar, writing about doing anthropology, famously called “the vulnerable observer;” that is, 
recognize that they are immersed in a practice to such an extent that full objectivity is neither 
possible nor desirable (see Behar 1996).4 But this does not mean I am endorsing full subjectivity 
either. My claim is simply that full objectivity is often a pretense anyway and we would do better 
to be more realistic and nuanced in our approach toward a practice in which we are already 
immersed. So I ask my readers to keep an open mind on my use of language until they hear this 
argument, and accept that given what I am arguing, I need to put my money where my mouth is, 
so to speak, and employ the techniques that I am arguing have been inappropriately and 
detrimentally suppressed by the current conventions of the profession. But rest assured, my 
stylistic choices are a compliment to and not a substitute for substance. I do not intend to forsake 
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analytical rigor. I simply ask for a little indulgence from those who are currently used to a more 
conventional approach, with the promise that I will do my best to ensure that by the end of this 
piece such indulgence will pay off. 
The Twenty-One Statements 
1. What Political Philosophy Is About  
Political philosophy should be about how we can better understand the nature and potential 
of social cooperation and how we can use that understanding to improve the arrangements under 
which we live.5 And sometimes it is. But often it is not. Often it relies on an utterly unrealistic 
view of human nature and circumstances and posits how we should arrange things in a world which 
does not exist and is not likely to exist anytime in the foreseeable future. Often it devolves into 
discussions of minuscule points of technical analysis that have little connection with the real world, 
engaging in discussions that have meaning only for insiders, and becomes what could be more 
accurately described as “philosophical trainspotting;” that is, a pointless activity obsessively 
pursued. Sometimes, even when it does have ramifications for the real world, it seems completely 
ignorant of or unconcerned with these effects, thinking that these are irrelevant as long as one is 
engaged in a search for truth and that there is no need to put political theories in any kind of context 
notwithstanding the possibility that these real-world ramifications may be dangerous and 
disturbing.  
The potential for problems arises here because the issues that political philosophers address 
are important. These include: What is human nature and what does human nature tell us about the 
political arrangements under which we should live? Should we have a government, or should we 
order our society by relying exclusively on private arrangements? If we should have a government, 
what aspects of our lives should it be allowed to regulate, and what sort of basic structure and 
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institutions should it have? More specifically, what kind of political system, what kind of economic 
system, what kind of legal system, what kind of education system, what kind of health care system, 
and what kind of welfare system should society have? What kinds of regulations are appropriate 
for these institutions to enact? How should we distribute the benefits and burdens of social 
cooperation, such as income and wealth, rights and obligations, and the bases of self-respect? What 
are rights, what rights should people have, and how should these rights be enforced? What is 
liberty, and when, if ever, can liberty be infringed? How should we decide this? What role should 
religion have, if any, in the government of society?  
But just because the issues that political philosophers address are important, this does not 
mean that what these philosophers have to say about them necessarily will be. While many people 
seem to think that as long as they talk about something that is profound, what they say will be 
profound, this is not correct. Thoughts about important topics can be just as inane as thoughts 
about inconsequential ones. And spouting inane or even just not very insightful observations about 
important topics and engaging in confused analyses of them can be dangerous, for such comments 
may lead us seriously astray, disguising the importance of what is stake rather than illuminating it, 
making the whole enterprise in which political philosophers are engaged seem trivial and silly or 
worse, encouraging us to take actions that will be counter-productive given our stated goals or 
even fully self-destructive.  
I will return to this point throughout this piece. But right now, I want to make some more 
general remarks about how the field of political philosophy can be better understood.  
2. The relationship between political, legal, and moral philosophy 
These three areas of philosophic inquiry are sometimes collectively referred to as “value 
theory,” but I find this label too abstract and over-inclusive to really capture the sense of what is 
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almost always approached as three distinct areas of inquiry. These three areas, however, are 
related—political philosophy is a subfield of moral philosophy, in the sense that moral philosophy 
is about the difference between right and wrong, while political philosophy is about the difference 
between right and wrong with regard to the design and operation of the institutions of society, the 
scope and nature of the rights, responsibilities, and opportunities these institutions generate, and 
the distribution of the burdens and benefits of social cooperation within this institutional structure.6 
Legal philosophy, in turn, is a subfield of political philosophy, as it is about how we should 
describe and regulate our rights, responsibilities, and opportunities through law. 
Note that some political philosophers, and an alarming number of politicians, deny this. 
That is, they deny that politics and therefore political philosophy necessarily contains a moral 
element.7 But as Berlin argued long ago in an important essay that now seems to have been 
forgotten, this is incorrect (see Berlin 2001). Even those who argue that political philosophy or at 
least politics is exclusively about promoting and achieving success, power, strength, wealth and 
so on are taking a moral position. Rather than rejecting moral values altogether, they are simply 
embracing moral values of a different sort. Berlin’s primary example was Machiavelli, but the 
same could be said of Friedrich Nietzsche, Joseph de Maistre, Carl Schmitt, and any other theorist 
or politician who places ends above means, success above integrity, order above justice, beauty 
above intellect, and so on (see, e.g., Machiavelli 1988; Nietzsche 1994; Schmitt 1996; Berlin 1990). As 
Berlin notes, in an enlightened society, these are unattractive moral choices, or at least they should 
be, but they are moral choices nonetheless (Berlin 2001: 44-5).  
3. The relationship between political philosophy and political science 
While there is no bright line between the two, political philosophy tends to focus on the 
normative, political science tends to focus on the descriptive—political science is an attempt to 
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bring the methods of the natural sciences to the study of political phenomena. In describing 
political phenomena, of course, political scientists are also interested in describing the causes of 
this phenomena. Some of these causes, of course, are normative. In other words, people sometimes 
behave in a certain manner because they believe they should behave in this manner, either because 
they believe this is morally required or because they believe it is in their interest to do so, or both. 
But political scientists are far less interested in arguing about whether these normative beliefs are 
justified than political philosophers; they are mostly interested in whether these normative beliefs 
exist and if so what they are. And if they are interested in whether these normative beliefs are 
justified, it is almost always possible prudential justifications on which they focus.  
Political philosophers, in contrast, are primarily interested in developing and defending the 
underlying justifications for our social institutions and their actions, and for our actions toward 
each other. Unlike political scientists, when it comes to focusing on prudential or moral 
justifications, political philosophers are primarily interested in the moral.8 While political 
philosophers often do rely on data for their views (and should do so more often), the acquisition 
of such data and the causal analysis that helps explain this data are generally seen as work for 
political scientists, economists, and others to do, at least to the extent that this causal analysis is 
physical rather conceptual. Because political philosophers focus on the normative, political science 
and political philosophy are fundamentally different enterprises requiring different sets of tools 
and skills. But one set is as necessary as the other. One has to have empirical data to make any 
meaningful observations about the world; but without normative analysis, data acquisition and 
empirical causal analysis alone are often useless. 
These differences in emphasis, however, have created problems running in both directions. 
Political scientists often present their data in great detail, reserving only a page or two at the end 
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for analysis, almost as an afterthought and in any event as a statement that presupposes the 
conclusions to be drawn from the relevant data are so clear that no one could reasonably disagree. 
Or, if it is unclear what conclusions should be drawn, that no one could say anything informative 
about what to make of the data they have presented “until further research is completed.” But many 
of these questions are not merely unresolved, they are unresolvable, at least to a degree of 
reasonable certainty. There are simply too many variables, and controlled experiments involving 
complex social or economic systems are either impossible to construct or unethical because this 
would put half the subjects of the experiment at unreasonable risk. And in the absence of the ability 
to conduct God-like experiments, the causal relations involved are too complex to ever be sorted 
out with sufficient clarity that those who are skeptical of the underlying causal claim will accept 
this sorting as correct. What remains is risk and uncertainty, and in such circumstances, we need 
moral principles to guide us, the development and application of which is the specialty of political 
philosophers. Political scientists therefore need to take what political philosophers do a lot more 
seriously. 
On the other hand, if political philosophy is to be relevant to decisions about how to react 
to or influence real world events, references to the state of our empirical knowledge are also 
required, if only to establish that in certain cases the extent of our empirical knowledge is 
incomplete. Yet political philosophers often look with disdain on work that refers to the empirical 
world, implying that the reliance on empirical data within philosophical argument necessarily 
makes one less philosophically sophisticated and weighty. Or, even worse, political philosophers 
sometime eschew the empirical world but not empirical assertions, making these as if no one in a 
more empirically-oriented field had ever looked into these matters, or acting as if reference to this 
work was both unnecessary and unhelpful in the high-minded world of the philosopher. While this 
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attitude is perhaps infrequent, it is frequent enough and endemic enough to undermine the 
reputation of the profession and suggest that the potential real-world relevance of what political 
philosophers do, or at least can do when they are their best, is less than it is. Even worse, it might 
be giving moral cover to those in the real world who are actually trying to change the nature of 
public discourse—those arguing that facts do not matter. Indeed, if anything is obvious from the 
latest presidential campaign in the US and the Brexit campaign in the UK and their subsequent 
ramifications, it is that we are moving toward a post-factual world, where utterly unsupported 
factual assertions are common and actual data is viewed as unreliable given the supposedly vast 
conspiracy by those in charge of generating such data to deceive us, making facts no longer 
relevant to opinion formation (see, e.g., Leonhardt and Thompson 2017; Skidelsky 2017; Stern 2017; 
Tappin, Van Der Leer, and McKay 2017; Worthen 2017; Sargent 2017; Douglass 2017). So not only do 
political scientists have to take the need for conceptual and normative analysis more seriously, 
political philosophers have to take their obligation to reference the real world more seriously too. 
4. Where the profession of political philosophy takes place 
Another important distinction between political science and political philosophy is where 
the work of each gets done. Political philosophy, unlike science, the arts, law, engineering and of 
course politics, takes place almost exclusively in the academy. This gives the academic political 
philosopher a role that those who specialize in these other fields do not need to undertake. That 
role is not simply analytical—to systematize and explain political phenomena taking place “out in 
the real world,” but to actually do political philosophy. For if those in the academy do not do it, it 
is not going to be done. Unlike most of their academic colleagues, political philosophers therefore 
have a dual responsibility—not only to teach others how to do political philosophy or at least how 
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to understand and interpret the real world better using the tools that political philosophers can 
provide, but also to actually do political philosophy themselves.  
5. More on the importance of political philosophy  
Unfortunately, this special role that political philosophers have to play in academia is often 
insufficiently recognized within the university, perhaps because everyone has political opinions 
and therefore it seems like no special expertise is required to form them. But just because everyone 
has political opinions does not mean that the enterprise of political philosophy, which strives to 
develop, organize, and place such opinions in an overarching coherent moral structure, is some 
lesser kind of intellectual exercise, one that anyone could do, as many academics (and especially 
non-political philosophers) seem to believe. To the contrary, political philosophy is one of the 
most important areas of intellectual inquiry that one could undertake. Unlike the ideas of those 
who specialize in other types of philosophy, the ideas of political philosophers have changed the 
world; not only when they are doing their job well, but also, unfortunately, when they are doing 
their job poorly. So the stakes are high for the political philosopher. Indeed, together with religion 
and technical change, nothing has been more responsible for great upheavals in human society 
than political philosophy. As Keynes said 
The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and 
when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the 
world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite 
exempt from any intellectual influences are usually the slaves of some defunct 
economist [or political philosopher]. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the 
air are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I 
am sure the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the 
gradual encroachment of ideas. Not, indeed, immediately, but after a certain 
interval; for in the field of economic and political philosophy there are not so many 
who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five or thirty years of age, 
so that the ideas of civil servants and politicians and even agitators are not likely to 
be the newest. But, sooner or later, it is ideas, not vested interests which are 
dangerous for good or evil. (Keynes 1964: 383-84) 
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Note that I have inserted another reference to political philosophers into the quote in 
brackets, just to emphasize Keynes’s point, for the quote is often truncated to contain only the first 
mention of political philosophers and this reference is then ignored. In its truncated form, the quote 
is then used to illustrate the importance of economics, (see, e.g., Quiggin 2012: 1; Heilbroner 1999: 
14), as if Keynes had not also expressly assigned equivalent importance to political philosophy. I 
shall say more about the relationship between political philosophy and economics in a moment, 
but right now I want to call attention to another point Keynes made in this passage that is also far 
too often ignored: that it is critically important to train young people in the means and methods of 
political philosophy and provide them with an adequate set of tools they can use to form and 
evaluate public policy when they (or at least some of them) become central figures in organizing 
our social life. For despite its obvious importance, political philosophy was then and is again now 
being undervalued and under-supplied in the academy.  
6. Primary and secondary political philosophy  
To begin to see what is happening in the profession, it is useful to divide the field into two 
types or levels of activity: primary political philosophy and secondary political philosophy (see 
Ball 1995: 44). Secondary political philosophy is the study, discussion, or attempt to clarify or 
perfect works of primary philosophy. Primary political philosophy is the offering of new theories 
of political morality. But this does not mean that works of primary political philosophy pay no 
attention to works of political philosophy that have come before. All political philosophy is 
informed by and illuminated in the light of the past, and therefore by “new” I do not mean to 
suggest that a work of primary philosophy has to start from scratch. There may be no bright line 
between the two, but work that is primary offers solutions or at least analyses that are sufficiently 
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different from that which has come before to be thought of as an independent alternative to the 
primary philosophy of the past. 
To be dynamic rather than static, the field of political philosophy requires work of both 
sorts. But we are currently in a period of intellectual stagnation. That is, what worthwhile work 
there is being generated now is almost exclusively of the secondary variety. Indeed, very little of 
the basic cannon of primary political philosophy now being taught (Rawls, Nozick, Dworkin, and 
so on) originates more recently than the wake of the Vietnam War, and much of it originates 
centuries and even millennia earlier (see Moore 2011). Moreover, political philosophers have now 
ceded much of the area of economic justice to economists, who for the most part expressly reject 
the idea that morality has anything to tell us about the economy or how to manage it (see Reiff 
2015a: 12-14). And depending on how cynical one wants to be, one can see the relatively recent 
explosion of work on global justice, unoriginal as this may be (it frequently just applies slightly 
tweaked principles of domestic justice to the international arena), as at least partially motivated by 
the feeling among many political philosophers that almost everything interesting and original that 
could be said about issues of domestic justice has already been said (see generally Brock 2017).  
Of course, it is no doubt true that doing primary rather than secondary political philosophy 
requires a vision that is as rare in political philosophy as it is in any other field. It may even be true 
that people who have such vision appear in waves rather than being scattered randomly across 
history. But it has been a very long time since the last wave hit. And it is not like there have been 
no significant events in our social and political life since the turn of the century that might suggest 
some new thinking by political philosophers would be helpful. We have had 9/11, the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, the consequences of which are still playing out, the civil war in Syria and the 
flood of refugees it has created, an exponential rise in economic inequality to levels not seen since 
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the Gilded Age, a financial collapse second only to the Great Depression followed by crushing 
unemployment, a reduction in unionization to levels not seen since before World War II, the 
resurrection of the extreme right in the US and elsewhere, political paralysis in government, Brexit, 
the rise of Donald Trump and Trumpism, and so on. So there has been plenty to react to. This 
suggests that there is something about the way we have institutionalized the teaching and 
production of political philosophy that is discouraging those with vision from coming forward or, 
even worse, preventing us from seeing them when they do. A certain kind of closed-mindedness 
seems to have overtaken the profession. Perhaps this is a characteristic of most historical periods, 
but there does appear to be something unusual about the current period that is making this problem 
particularly acute.  
7. Incrementalism in political philosophy 
One reason why the profession is so stalled at the moment is that too many political 
philosophers have adopted the methodology of incrementalism. In the sciences, in law, and 
perhaps in some of the social sciences and humanities too, incrementalism may indeed be the best 
and most effective way of improving our thinking about various matters. But this is not true in the 
arts and in political philosophy. This is not to say that incrementalism does not have a place in 
either field, but that the nature of each field is such that it requires bold new ideas in order to move 
forward. Not only because intellectual and aesthetic advancement in these fields comes in leaps 
more often that steps, but also because “moving forward” requires the production of work that 
captures the imagination of the people, those outside the discipline, or at least some of those 
people, for only then can each field have the real-world effects which are its reason to exist. And 
new ideas are required to attract people outside the discipline. But new ideas arise in political 
philosophy with appalling infrequency. And when they do, these ideas are often not engaged by 
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other political philosophers. They are not even attacked—they are simply ignored, the death knell 
for any attempt at intellectual advancement (see Mills 1959: 125-6).  
In this sense, political philosophers face an even more difficult task than their counterparts 
in art. Because art is not primarily an academic discipline, it is often possible to find some portion 
of the population that is receptive to new work, even work that breaks sharply with the past. It is 
much more difficult, in contrast, for new ideas to penetrate the academic consciousness. There is 
probably no reason why this must be so, but the academic arena has a tendency to become 
hermetically sealed from within. Academics often became academics precisely because they 
became infatuated with certain ideas when they were young, and they naturally have difficulty 
bringing themselves to recognize that the inspirational ideas in which they invested their careers 
have not and will not work. Indeed, there may be nothing more difficult than trying to get someone 
to understand something when maintaining their current intellectual commitments requires that 
they not understand it. Faced with what often seems like a black hole for new ideas, then, 
incrementalism appears to be the safer strategy. And sometimes, no doubt, this strategy may bear 
fruit. But this is not how political ideas outside the academy tend to rise and fall. Incrementalism 
is one thing, but incrementalism in the face of rapidly moving erroneous but bold ideas out in the 
real world is foolhardy. The political philosopher, as Nietzsche correctly realized, needs to not 
only reach for the pen in such times, but also for the hammer (Nietzsche 1990). Dangerous ideas 
need to be directly confronted and attacked, and ideas that have proved impotent or counter-
productive no matter how promising they once seemed cannot be allowed to frame the debate 
forever. 
Another form of incrementalism that I should mention here is hyper-specialization. There 
a growing tendency in all fields of inquiry, and political philosophy is no exception, to be broken 
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down into smaller and smaller subfields as the field matures. This tendency has been demonstrated 
in value theory by the creation of environmental ethics, bio-ethics, global ethics, business ethics, 
and so on as distinct subfields of inquiry. Even though these subfields are formally denominated 
parts of ethics, given the connection between moral and political philosophy they often deal with 
issues within the realm of political philosophy. The creation of ever-finer subfields of inquiry, 
however, necessarily makes the focus of those involved in them much narrower, and therefore 
makes the creation of new, broader, generalizable theories of political philosophy much less likely. 
Moreover, once born, these subfields tend to branch off like the lives of Derek Parfit’s famous 
duplicated man (see Parfit 1984: 200-1, 215-6, 242-3, and 287-9), with each branch quickly 
establishing its own conventions, specialized expertise, language, and literature. New faculty are 
hired expressly to focus on one of these subfields or another and having been categorized like this, 
may find it difficult to be taken seriously if they try to do something else. Innovations in thinking 
in one subfield are not easily discoverable by those in others, partly because people tend not to 
look beyond their own backyard, and partly because the particularized language and literature each 
develops makes them less accessible to outsiders. Of course, I am not denying that important work 
can take place in such subfields; indeed, under the current circumstances, this may be where the 
most important work is currently being done. But the barriers erected by subfield divisions often 
serve to stifle more general advances and to make more particularized advances that can generalize 
harder to access. Once begun, however, such fragmentation is almost impossible to reverse. The 
only real avenue of response is to try to build awareness of the danger hyper-specialization presents 
and do whatever may be possible to break down the walls that hyper-specialization tends to erect.  
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8. Political philosophy and economics and the relationship between empirical and 
moral argument 
 
Another reason why contemporary political philosophy has become so timid about 
advancing new ideas is that it has ceded much of the territory of practical relevance to economics. 
An example of this is the question of what government should do, if anything, about 
unemployment, and the threat automation presents to our economic well-being. Another is whether 
and if so to what extent economic growth is an unabashed good, and in either case what we should 
do about the possibility that we are moving into a period of secular stagnation (see, e.g., Gordon 
2016).9 While political theorists have been writing about economic inequality for decades, 
unemployment, economic growth, and many other issues that have to do with economic justice are 
today often viewed as issues that only economists may discuss, at least among those who currently 
hold senior positions in university departments and leading journals and publishing houses and 
therefore have the most influence in setting the agenda of the profession. This is not good for 
political philosophy, and it is not good society, for it suggests that many issues of great public 
import are simply empirical disputes to be resolved by those who purport to be (but in reality are 
not even if they do not admit or realize this) mere technicians trained in determining what 
economic policies will have what economic effects. Indeed, economists often act as if moral 
reasoning plays and should play no role in their discipline at all. Economics is about means, they 
say; the selection of ends is up to someone else (see, e.g., Robbins 1932: 23). Because I have 
detailed the extent to which this is not true elsewhere at great length (see Reiff 2015a: 11-15), I 
will not say more about this point here, but I will point out that this widely-held belief among 
economists leads them to apply moral principles on a barely conscious or sub-conscious level, 
leaving these principles too far off-stage for their own much less anyone else’s critical examination 
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and review. This, in turn, prevents us from recognizing that moral principles are actually central 
to our decision about what to do in these cases and thereby prevents us from considering what 
those moral principles might require. Economics, after all, is just the causal part of political 
philosophy. The moral part is what is commonly done by political philosophers, and it is morality 
that tells us what to do in cases of empirical uncertainty by advising us which risks we should take 
and which we should eschew (see Reiff 2015a: 13-15).10  
9. What can go wrong with theories in political philosophy 
There are various other ways in which theories in political philosophy can go wrong even 
when they do attempt to tackle issues of primary importance.11 Understanding these is important 
not only if we are to analyze and construct theories of political morality, but also if we are to 
understand where the profession of political philosophy can go wrong. Some of these problems, 
of course, are more serious than others, and later I shall discuss these particular problems further. 
But for now, it may be helpful to have a list of all of the ways in which theories can go wrong in 
one place. In considering this list, however, remember that just because a theory can be criticized 
on one or more of these grounds does not mean those criticisms are correct. Indeed, much of what 
political philosophers do consists of arguing about whether some theory is afflicted with one or 
more of these problems or not. 
A theory may be incorrect. In this case, the theory makes predictions that turn out to be 
wrong—that is, the predictions that the theory makes are either empirically untrue or contrary to 
what morality actually requires us to do according to some other, more persuasive theory or 
perhaps merely our considered moral intuitions. In either case, one way to deal with this problem 
is to shrink the scope of the theory—in other words, apply the theory to a more limited set of 
circumstances in which the problems with the broader theory do not arise. This is arguably what 
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Rawls did in describing his theory of justice as fairness as a political conception, which he then 
distinguished from a comprehensive conception (see Rawls 2001: 14). If this is not possible, 
however, the theory may have to be abandoned. An example of the latter kind of theory is the view 
that if you want to help the poor, give money to the rich, and it will “trickle-down” to those less 
fortunate like manna from heaven. This view, as I have argued at length elsewhere, is empirically 
false and morally reprehensible (see Reiff 2015a: 61-2, 99; 2015b: 66-70; 2012), although it 
continues to be the unwavering policy of the Republican party (see Cassidy 2016).  
A theory may be trivial. In this case, the predictions the theory makes are true, but 
insignificant or obvious, regardless of whether they purport to be primary or secondary. This is the 
basis of the criticism leveled by Stanley Fish against Law’s Empire and Ronald Dworkin’s theory 
of adjudication (see Fish 1989). To deal with this problem, a theorist could broaden the scope of 
the theory or give it further content in order to make it more useful and important. But many times, 
doing this effectively requires a new theory altogether, which means the old theory might as well 
be abandoned. 
A theory may be empty. In this case, the theory makes predictions only about a certain set 
of cases and there are in fact no cases which are actually members of that set. This is the criticism 
Hegel makes against Kant’s theory of freedom, and that political perfectionists make against 
liberalism—specifically that liberalism’s only policy is permissiveness, and that liberalism is 
accordingly empty of guidance about what we should do (see Reiff 2007: 202). It is also, for 
example, what was (among other things) claimed to have been wrong with President Trump’s 
theory that he lost the popular vote only because of widespread voting fraud by undocumented 
immigrants, for almost no examples of such illegal voting could be found (see Tackett and Wines 
2018). Emptiness is a serious problem, and if true it is probably impossible to remedy. Again, a 
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theory which suffers from this problem might as well be abandoned, for it only has relevance in 
the hypothetical worlds created in the academy. As far as the real word goes, empty theories cannot 
be used for anything but to mislead and to deceive. 
A theory may be incoherent. This can happen in a variety of ways. For example, a theory 
could apply inconsistent assumptions, or it could be impossible to articulate or apply, or both. This 
is one of the criticisms I make elsewhere against nihilism (see Reiff 2007: 197-9). Many other 
theories fall into this category too. Other examples include the claim that economic austerity is 
expansionary, which is conceptually incoherent as well as being empirically untrue (see Reiff 
2015a: 113-34, 2015b:1-40), and the claim that all government regulation is antithetical to the idea 
of a free market economy (see, e.g., Viner 1927: 231-232; Osborne 2007; Reiff 2017b). 
Unfortunately, theories that are actually incoherent often have great intuitive appeal—that is, they 
seem plausible on a superficial level and only reveal themselves to be incoherent when subjected 
to more detailed consideration. This is why, despite their incoherence and their failure in the past, 
many incoherent theories continue to walk zombie-like into the future. 
A theory may be indeterminate. In this case, the theory does not make specific predictions 
about what state of affairs shall obtain, but it does make general ones. That is, the theory eliminates 
some possible outcomes, but more than one outcome may still be possible under the theory. A 
theory like this may nevertheless be very valuable because eliminating some options is often very 
useful. On the other hand, if there are too many options that would still be consistent with the 
theory, the theory may need to be supplemented with another so that it can generate more specific 
predictions. The indeterminacy objection is one of the objections I raise to the difference principle, 
the principle governing the distribution of social primary goods for which John Rawls is justly 
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famous, and to luck egalitarianism (see Reiff 2012). In these cases, I think these indeterminacies 
are irresolvable, but in many cases, they are not. 
A theory may be utopian. In this case, the theory relies on unrealistic assumptions about 
human nature and/or circumstances, and therefore does not make predictions that are likely to be 
useful in the real world. Sometimes it may be good for a theory to be a little utopian, because it is 
possible that if people embrace the theory, some sort of moral transformation may occur. There is 
nothing wrong with encouraging people to listen to the better angels of their nature. Arguably, this 
is what happened when we embraced theories against racial discrimination—initially, some people 
thought that we could not expect people to treat members of other races the same way they treated 
members of their own race, but by declaring that all races should be treated equally, we helped 
change people’s attitudes. Today most people agree that racial discrimination is wrong and should 
not be permitted, although given the success of race-baiting in the 2016 US presidential campaign 
and the UK Brexit vote, not as many as I had thought. On the other hand, the assumption that 
socialism would eventually work a moral transformation of people’s attitudes regarding what 
distributive justice required proved to be a spectacular failure, despite what G. A. Cohen thought 
even unto death (see Cohen 2009).  
A theory may be untestable. In this case, the assumptions on which the theory relies and/or 
the predictions that it makes are not amenable to empirical refutation or proof. Many theories suffer 
from this problem, at least in part, for it is difficult to experiment with theories for the design of 
society; one can usually only implement them or not and hope for the best. But this does not mean 
that theories that are untestable should be rejected. There are many things we know but cannot 
prove that still can and should provide powerful reasons for action. On the other hand, as Mark 
Twain is reputed to have said, “it’s not what you don’t know that gets you into trouble, it’s what 
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you know for sure that just ain’t so.” An example of the latter is the view that housing prices cannot 
go down everywhere at once, a view that helped produce the 2008 financial crisis (Ip 2018). So 
care should be taken before acting on any theory that is untestable in advance.  
A theory may be impractical. Such a theory may be conceptually correct, but there are such 
practical impediments to its implementation or to obtaining the data it requires that there is no 
chance it could ever be put into effect. This is one criticism that is raised against Robert Nozick’s 
historical entitlement theory of distributive justice—given that almost nothing that is currently 
owned was initially justly acquired and thereafter only justly transferred, a huge amount of 
rectification would be required and this is so impractical that discussion of his theory and its 
ramifications amounts to nothing more than an academic exercise.12 This is also an objection that 
can be raised to Ronald Dworkin’s “envy test,” which describes how one could ensure a just initial 
distribution of resources (see Dworkin 2000: 67-8, 70, 73, 85-6). While the envy test may be a 
practical way of making a fair initial allocation of resources on a lightly-populated desert island 
where there are few resources to be divided, it requires information that we do not know and could 
not possibly obtain in the world in which we actually live. Although it may be useful sometimes 
to know that something is conceptually possible even if not actually possible given our current 
limitations, we can often become deluded by such theories into thinking they tell us more about 
our lives than they actually do. Such theories should accordingly be approached with caution.  
A theory may be self-defeating. A theory is self-defeating when doing as it recommends 
makes it less likely that its goals will be achieved (see Parfit 1984: 3-51, 87-100). A theory that 
directs one to consciously plan to be more spontaneous, for example, would be patently self-
defeating. In an article called “The Politics of Masochism,” I claim that liberal egalitarianism is 
self-defeating, or at least self-limiting, because it will naturally produce the background conditions 
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necessary to trigger economically masochistic behavior among the very people it is designed to 
assist (Reiff 2003). Elsewhere, I claim that a belief in collective responsibility is self-defeating, 
for it encourages people to behave wrongly—if you know you will get blamed for the wrongdoing 
of others even if you behave well, and there is always somebody who is going to behave badly, 
why not commit some wrongdoing yourself and at least get some personal benefit out of it? (Reiff 
2008). A theory that is self-defeating, of course, effectively provides its own reasons for 
abandonment. 
A theory may be too easily subject to misuse. All theories, even if correct, can be 
misunderstood and accidentally or perhaps even deliberately misapplied. Sometimes, these 
unintended consequences may be anticipated and therefore headed off at the proverbial pass. But 
sometimes a theory may be so easily misunderstood, and corrective measures so easy to ignore or 
difficult to implement, that the theory is likely to be more dangerous and destructive than helpful. 
It may be, for example, that torture can sometimes be morally justified—maybe even morally 
required (see, for example, the argument for torture made in Kamm 2011: 3-72). Those that believe 
this (and similarly controversial positions) should feel free to make their views clear. But when 
they do, they should also recognize that views like this can be easily misappropriated, extended 
beyond their intended scope, misinterpreted in dangerous ways, and otherwise misused with real-
world political consequences. Political philosophers should always be alert to this possibility and 
take action to minimize the chances it will occur. If they do not, they may find their theories used 
for purposes they find perverse and with which they would seriously disagree. Indeed, this is 
exactly what has happened to the difference principle, which has among other things has been used 
to provide moral cover for the “trickle-down” theory of supply-side economics, thereby increasing 
economic inequality, not reducing it as Rawls intended (see Reiff 2012). And it is not sufficient to 




April 4, 2018  Page 25 
respond to a charge of unintentionally aiding and abetting evil by saying that one’s theory has been 
misapplied if one could have anticipated this misuse and attempted to preempt it. 
10. The aversion to real world issues and the fear of controversy among 
contemporary political theorists  
 
Another way on which political theory can go wrong has nothing to do with defects in the 
conception or operation of the theory itself but relates to whether philosophers today are 
sufficiently willing to take the risks required for primary political theory to be created. This should 
not need to be said, but it does—political philosophers should not shy away from issues that are, 
well, political, in the sense of being controversial statements about what to do about issues of great 
public import that actually have some possibility of being instantiated in the real world instead of 
being merely expressions of unlikely-to-ever-be-realized utopian ideas. This does not mean that 
this is all political philosophers should do; merely that this is one of the things that political 
philosophers should do. Yet many political philosophers today, especially some of those at our 
most prestigious academic institutions, seem to be fervently committed to never saying anything 
that could possibly have any effect in the real world and thereby bring controversy down upon 
them. And I am not just talking about junior faculty who fear not getting tenure and therefore 
censure themselves to avoid any possible blowback to their careers. Many senior, long-tenured 
political philosophers today seem afraid of saying anything controversial too, unless it is so 
completely infeasible as to be effectively non-threatening. “Nothing a political theorist says could 
possibly have an effect on the real world anyway,” a respected senior political theorist who was 
then head of his department at a world-class university once told me.13 And the explanation for 
this cannot simply be that having adopted timidity and blandness as a survival strategy when junior, 
these attitudes become impossible to shake once senior. The pressure to conform created by the 
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tenure-system has always been there, yet risk-taking was much more prevalent in political 
philosophy in previous periods and still is prevalent in at least some other disciplines today. The 
risk-aversion characterizing the discipline today must accordingly have some other sources that 
we need to identify and control if political philosophy is to become more vigorous and topical once 
again.  
One source of this overly self-deprecating and inevitably self-defeating attitude is what has 
become the general corporatization of the academy. Universities, the claim now goes, should be 
run like businesses, and the first rule of running a business is to ensure that everyone who is 
employed in that business respects the authority of their line managers, does what they are told, 
and gets along. Whether this is indeed good for business I will leave to others to debate, but even 
if it is, in the academy it is deadly. People who respect the authority of their line managers tend to 
respect authority full stop, and as Hillel Steiner, one of the few giants of modern political 
philosophy who is still active today once quipped, “used to be, having a lack of respect for 
authority was a requirement for being an academic.”14 The reason for this was that a willingness 
to defy authority was seen as a necessary attribute if one was to be willing and able to effectively 
express and defend positions that might be disruptive to the existing technical, intellectual, and/or 
political order. But this has changed. The more hierarchical an organization becomes—and the 
corporatization of universities has made them much more hierarchical—the more a respect for 
authority seems essential if the organization is to run smoothly.15 Even challenging the views of 
colleagues who are merely co-academics and not academic administrators can be seen as 
detrimental to good order and discipline within the academy today, although one would have 
thought that academics should be used to having their views challenged. If such challenges occur 
on a regular basis, this is seen as interfering with the “collegiality” of a department, and a 
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department that lacks collegiality is viewed as “dysfunctional.” Such a department is then likely 
to get little or no support from its academic dean and to have the number of its academic lines and 
programs frozen if not cut or allowed to disappear through attrition. So while the impetus behind 
enforcing collegiality may be well-intentioned, it creates an academic environment that is unlikely 
to be lively and dynamic and is antithetical to intellectual progress within the discipline.  
Rather than having its intellectual edges softened to such an extent that the chances of 
disharmony have been effectively eliminated, a discipline like political philosophy needs 
philosophers on both the left and the right whose commitment to their views brings with it the 
continuing possibility of conflict. While these philosophers should respect each other as persons 
and therefore treat one another as persons deserving of such respect, this does not mean they must 
feign respect for one another’s ideas. Indeed, depending on what these ideas are, it may be the case 
that they should despise one another’s ideas (see Berlin 2002b: 229 for the attribution of a similar 
view to Mill). Political philosophy involves the most fundamental notions of how society should 
be organized and what each of our roles should be in this, and given the importance of such issues, 
people often do and really should care deeply about them. In such cases, it is simply unreasonable 
to expect those with strongly opposed views on these issues to treat each other as if their respective 
views were simply inconsequential matters of taste. Nor is it true that all political theories on either 
the left or the right can be viewed by those on the other side as within what Rawls famously called 
“the burdens of judgment,” or the reasons why reasonable people can reasonably disagree (Rawls 
1993, 1996: 54ff). The farther we go in either direction the harder this becomes. But out of the 
heat of intellectual conflict, great ideas are born, fleshed out, and become capable of withstanding 
attack. So we are hampering the development of primary political philosophy by insisting that 
academics not disrespect each other’s work in the name of what in reality is a false civility. It is 
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far more important to have a diversity of views among political philosophers than construct a 
department where everyone feels comfortable together at a backyard barbecue, even if this makes 
a department more difficult to manage. Ease of management is not a formula for invention and 
innovation; it is a tell-tale sign of a mediocracy, an organization in which being mediocre becomes 
a necessary attribute for success. This, in turn, threatens to turn the academy into what Simon Leys 
called “The Hall of Uselessness” (Leys 2011: esp. 42). Any university that has a group of political 
philosophers that all get along is likely doing something very wrong.  
11. The role of ideal theory in political philosophy 
One of the ways that many current political philosophers have avoided clashing with one 
another is to abstract out from the questions that divide us—to do what is currently labeled “ideal 
theory.” Ideal theory is commonly thought to be theory about what would be most just in an ideal 
world, whereas non-ideal theory is viewed as being about what would be “second-best” (or third 
best of fourth best), justified only where practical considerations indicate that moral compromises 
have to be made given the world in which we live. And ideal theorists often express outright 
contempt for the non-ideal. The contemporary political philosopher Andrew Mason, for example, 
asks “what reason do we have for thinking that any adequate analysis of an ideal such as justice 
must be conducted in the light of an investigation of what is feasible?” (Mason 2004: 255).16  
But in my view, this represents a misunderstanding of how ideal theory was originally 
conceived. Ideal theory was originally not meant to be ideal in this very strong sense, but to be 
ideal only in the sense that it was to be tested under the assumption of favorable circumstances; 
that is, circumstances that are realistically achievable, not highly unlikely or infeasible (see Rawls 
1971, 199: 216; Simmons 2010). And even then, whatever theory one develops in this light must 
be further tested to see if it can bear what Rawls calls “the strains of commitment” (Rawls 2001: 
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102-3, 124-6; Rawls 1971, 1999: 123-6, 153; Waldron 2016). These are the reasons why people 
might urge renegotiation of a theory once they become aware of how it applies to them. If a theory 
cannot withstand the strains of commitment, this is a reason to reject it, regardless of whether it 
might be suitable in a world where people were not so obsessed with furthering their own interests 
even at the expense of the interests of others. Clearly, this is not the same thing as imagining what 
theory would hold in an ideal world, where there would be little scarcity and much altruism, and 
few (or perhaps no) people who might be trying to subvert the theory or who would be incapable 
of conforming to it. Ideal theory in the weaker sense does not disregard human nature and 
circumstances. Ideal theory in the stronger sense is simply a silly waste of time, for no theory that 
does disregard human nature and circumstances is worth fretting about. Moral theory is supposed 
to provide us some guidance as to how we should live, and theory that is ideal in the strong sense 
rejects this as a goal.  
I could say more about how those who think of themselves as doing ideal theory have gone 
astray, but the debate over ideal/non-ideal theory has absorbed far too many intellectual resources 
already.17 I do want, however, to point to one side-effect of the current obsession with doing ideal 
theory in this strong way that has particular relevance to the issues we are discussing here: the 
focus on the ideal functions as a way of putting down those who can be characterized as doing 
non-ideal theory, for it allows this latter kind of theory to be dismissed as simply a modus vivendi, 
as being intellectually impure and morally compromised. It allows usefulness to be used against 
itself. The claim to moral primacy by the ideal is accordingly something that all serious political 
philosophers should reject. 
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12. Political philosophy and the politics of the academy 
Political philosophers can be based in philosophy departments, politics departments, 
economics departments, law schools, business schools, and elsewhere as well. You would think 
that a field which is this interdisciplinary would have a lot of influence in the academy, especially 
now that interdisciplinarity has become intellectually chic. But it does not. Political philosophy’s 
interdisciplinary nature simply produces a dilution of its power within the academy and therefore 
results in its marginalization. Political philosophy is marginalized by non-political philosophers 
because it is easily accessible and popular (at least when taught well), and its potential accessibility 
and popular appeal is thought to be evidence that it is intellectually unsophisticated. It is 
marginalized by political scientists because it is theoretical and conceptual and not empirical and 
therefore not a source of the kind of sizeable grants that political scientists spend most of their time 
pursuing and which give those who can attract such grants power and prestige within the 
university. It is marginalized by law professors because it is not substantive “black-letter law” and 
is therefore viewed as not helping students understand and win ordinary or even constitutional 
legal disputes and therefore, as I heard one very respected professor of legal and political 
philosophy (incorrectly, in my view) tell his law students in his introductory lecture, “the material 
we will cover in this class will not help you get the Mercedes, if that is what you want.” And it is 
marginalized by economists because it is not mathematical and is deliberately normative in the 
moral (as opposed to the prudential) sense, even though the mathematization of economics is itself 
a fairly recent development (see Debreu 1991)18 and as I have already noted, economics is morally 
normative too although economists often do not realize this or admit it when they do. Taken 
together, these various forces not only disempower political philosophy within the academy, they 
also make courses in political philosophy far less numerous and therefore far less accessible than 
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existing or at least potential student demand for such courses would otherwise suggest they should 
be.19 Because of the way in which the academy is organized, political philosophy tends to be both 
undersupplied and insufficiently supported.  
13. The language of political philosophy 
If political philosophy is to have some effect on the real world, political philosophers must 
speak in a language that most people can understand and reject the exclusivity of the mathematical 
language of economists. They must also eschew the dry and sometimes symbol-laden language 
that has become so common in other forms of philosophy today. They must use real-world 
examples, draw on popular culture, sometimes employ sarcasm and humor, and try to make their 
writing as vivid and vivacious as literary if not popular fiction. Political philosophy should be 
philosophy for the masses, even when it is written as a direct communication to the elite for their 
communication to the masses, and therefore always should be written so as to be accessible and 
meaningful to everyone and beyond that, to actually move people to take action and radically 
reform their opinions about the world.  
Unfortunately, political philosophy written in this way, even when it makes well-defended 
and innovative claims, is often dismissed as rhetoric. Effective rhetoric is then further disparaged 
by being characterizing as a polemic, which today has a derogatory connotation even though the 
word “polemic” merely means “argument,” albeit a particularly vigorous one perhaps (see 
generally Norris 2017; Garsten 2011). Rhetoric, of course, is also simply forceful argument, and 
using rhetoric or even creating something that can be characterized as a polemic does not mean 
that ideology and emotion have been substituted for reasoned argument.20 Indeed, all language is 
rhetoric; it would be impossible to speak in any other way (see de Man 1979: 105-6, quoting 
Nietzsche). Language that is supposedly drained of rhetoric is just dull; what is left is still rhetoric, 
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it is just ineffective rhetoric, for it has been deliberately designed to not be engaging for the reader. 
The current insistence on understatement and on cool, supposedly objective, emotional detachment 
in political philosophy is simply a form of self-delusion, a way of simulating doing something 
more akin to science than a truly qualitive evaluation and analysis of the arrangements under which 
we live. The latter approach is the one political philosophers should take, for two reasons.  
First, it is not the political philosopher’s job to adopt the so-called “view from nowhere” 
(Nagel 1986). That view may be appropriate in other areas of philosophy, but not in political 
philosophy. Indeed, it is not even possible in political philosophy. Political philosophers are always 
somewhere, immersed in a society that has an established political culture and usually many 
established subcultures too. Even historians of political philosophy are somewhere, writing about 
the present even if they are doing so by describing what is in reality the present’s views of the past. 
Every political culture has its fundamental presuppositions, and the very fact that these 
presuppositions are so fundamental means that they are difficult to see for those who are already 
steeped in examining the world through the moral framework that these presuppositions 
necessarily create, much less to abstract out from them.21 This does not mean that political 
philosophers should not try to be aware of these presuppositions and how they shape the very way 
everyone who accepts them thinks about problems in political philosophy—it merely means that 
when they do examine these fundamental presuppositions they have to be discussed in passionate 
terms or the essential “fundamental-ness” of these ideas is either being missed or inappropriately 
denied. 
Second, as Berlin argued in the passage I quoted at the beginning of this essay, the very 
role of the political philosopher (or an important part of it at least) is to motivate social and political 
action, either in the sense of trying to put the brakes on irrational or morally objectionable political 
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movements or start or fuel rational and morally praiseworthy ones. Argumentative intensity is 
necessary for this. Of course, this does not mean that we should all adopt the Trumpian practice of 
inflammatory hyperbole, an approach that results in the complete debasement of language and the 
elimination of meaningful categorization through the elimination of every shade of grey (see 
Hohmann 2018). I am not advocating moving from one extreme to another here. In other words, I 
am not arguing that the political philosopher should adopt the extreme internal point of view, the 
point of view of the fully committed participant, although much supposedly primary and even 
secondary political philosophy is done from this perspective without acknowledging it, and even 
worse, affirmatively concealing it under a patina of detachment created through the use of formal 
and artificially restrained language. What is a required is not feigned detachment with covert 
commitment, but what H. L. A. Hart calls a “critical reflective attitude” (Hart 1994: 57); that is, “a 
general disposition to comply with the requirements of some duty-imposing norm(s), a general 
disposition to object to contraventions of those requirements by other people, and a general 
disposition to acknowledge the appropriateness of censure that is directed against one’s own 
contraventions of those requirements” (Kramer 2018: ch. 3).22 The critical reflective attitude, in 
turn, is what enables the political philosopher to adopt a moderate internal point of view, the point 
of view of those who strive to present not only justified but also persuasive recommendations about 
the proper organization of our social and political life, recommendations to which they themselves 
are and acknowledge themselves to be subject. And this requires the effective use of rhetoric, not 
just a fetish for argumentative comprehensiveness. In any event, there is no reason why political 
philosophy cannot be vivid in its use of metaphor and imagination and otherwise written in an 
engaging style and not also be rigorous, focused on precise distinctions, and argumentatively tight 
(See Dryzek 2010; Garsten 2006; O’Neill 2002; Grassi 1980). The fact that contemporary works 
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of political philosophy do not often exhibit both sets of characteristics is the fault of these works 
themselves, and not some inherent contradiction between style and substance.  
14. Analytic v. Continental political philosophy 
In the Anglo-American world, most political philosophy is what is called “analytic” 
political philosophy. Of course, most philosophy in the Anglo-American world is analytic 
philosophy, so the fact that that there should be analytic political philosophy should come as no 
surprise. All analytic philosophy (political and non-political) prizes tight argumentation, precise 
definition of terms, and conceptual analysis. But non-political analytic philosophers often criticize 
political analytic philosophers for not being analytic enough. And it is true that in addition to 
clarity, argumentative precision, and completeness, the best analytic political philosophers strive 
to be colorful, accessible to outsiders, topical and relevant to real world decisions. Some non-
political analytic philosophers see this as a compromise of analytical purity and precision. On the 
other hand, many non-analytic philosophers and other kinds of intellectuals and laypeople too 
criticize analytic philosophers for being so obsessed with analytic precision that their work is dry, 
tedious, relentlessly abstract, intellectually atomized, and boring, providing an experience for the 
reader that is similar to eating a loaf of toast. And if this is the result of a full commitment to the 
analytic style, it is not a bad thing for political philosophers to avoid this approach and instead 
make their work more accessible. Regardless of whether analytical political philosophy is too 
analytical in the objectionable way I have identified, however, the criticism that it is insufficiently 
analytical should clearly be rejected. 
In any event, analytic political philosophy is just a style—political philosophy can also be 
written in what is called the “continental” style. Technically, the term “continental” is used to refer 
to a group of post-structuralist and post-post-structuralist philosophers (both political and non-
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political) who are mostly French-speakers, such as Derrida, Foucault, Rancière, Deluze and 
Guattari (see, e.g., Rancière 2012). But the term is also sometimes used more loosely to refer to 
anyone who does not write strictly in the analytic style, including such giants as Kant, Hegel, and 
of course Marx, although there is a form of Marxist political philosophy produced in the Anglo-
American world called “analytic Marxism,” which is the kind of Marxist material produced by the 
political philosophers G. A Cohen, Jon Elster, John Romer, and others too (see Cohen 2001; Elster 
1985; Romer 1986). And of course, some philosophers (especially contemporary philosophers) 
who are from the continent nevertheless write in the analytic style, mostly in English but 
sometimes in their native language, and some Anglo-American philosophers write in the 
continental style (see, e.g., Cornell 1992). So the distinction here is not strictly based on national 
origin or language but rather on the means of expression one chooses to use. In any event, for my 
purposes it is sufficient to understand the term “continental” as simply a catch-all for anyone who 
does not employ the analytic style.  
The reason I am mentioning this is that analytic philosophers often disparage continental 
philosophy, and especially the continental style, as being flabby and undisciplined, interminably 
long-winded, plagued by vague and ill-defined terms and full of obscure and incomplete arguments 
or no arguments at all. In other words, the continental style is assumed to reflect a lack of not only 
argumentative precision and rigor, but also substance, especially in more modern works. This, in 
turn, leads analytic political philosophers and therefore most of their students to believe that 
continental philosophy—or at least contemporary continental philosophy—is not a worthwhile 
source of ideas or arguments or insights into our respective and often shared social and political 
experience.  
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But this is not correct. Continental philosophy—or at least continental political philosophy, 
simply has different objectives in mind. Instead of clarity and argumentative precision, it believes 
that such attributes are mere illusions, for in its view language is not capable of accomplishing 
this, and instead proceeds more like poetry or fiction. It is much more interested in the use of 
history and metaphor as a source of argumentative power and less obsessed with avoiding detours 
and digressions, and, in any event, is more often designed to create a general impression rather 
than communicate a precise argument. Its appeal is therefore intended to be more holistic than 
finely targeted, more tentative and tantalizing than final and complete. It aims to provoke and raise 
questions rather than provide answers. But this does not mean it does not aim to persuade. It simply 
aims to persuade that rather than looking for precise solutions, one should look more generally to 
refine one’s attitudes and overall approaches. Continental political philosophy is accordingly just 
as rigorous as analytic political philosophy in the sense that it attempts to fully explore the issues 
it addresses—it just has a wider conception of what such exploration means. As political 
philosophy, it can accordingly be just as effective in stirring its readers to action (if not more so) 
than the kind of philosophy that is so often written in the analytic style.  
But I am not arguing that we must or should abandon the argumentative precision and 
completeness of analytic political philosophy for the looser more impassioned approach of 
continental philosophy. Indeed, I have already stated my view that if we want to, we can have 
precision and completeness and present arguments that are more engaging too. What I am arguing 
here is that it is simply irrational to ignore a style of philosophic inquiry that has had such a huge 
influence on the world, despite its lack of analytic precision. While non-analytic philosophy is 
marginalized in most English-speaking philosophy and politics departments, it is the dominant 
basis for literary criticism and analysis and is also extremely influential in sociology, women’s 
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studies, cultural studies, and in many other fields as well. Denigrating continental political 
philosophy leads many analytic political philosophers to miss the various insights into 
contemporary problems or phenomena that other academics have repeatedly found in works of 
continental philosophy. And not only works of continental philosophy from the left. Indeed, if we 
are to understand the thinking beyond the lurch to the right that is occurring throughout much of 
the world today, we had better stop blaming this on pure irrationalism and start playing closer 
attention to the works of continental political philosophers like Giovanni Gentile, Carl Schmitt, 
Joseph de Maistre, Othmar Spann, Julius Evola, Alain de Benoist, Ivan Ilyin, and so on, all of 
whom have been extremely influential on the contemporary right (see Gregor 2005; Gentile 2002; 
Spann 2011 [1930]; McCormick 1997; Evola 1995; Berlin 1990; Barbashin and Thoburn 2015; 
Benoist 2017; Sheehan 1982: 50-63). It is accordingly important for students of political 
philosophy to understand both the continental and the analytic reservoir of ideas on offer and the 
advantages and disadvantages of using the analytic or the continental style as their primary form 
of expression. Instead of eschewing the continental style and dismissing the ideas of continental 
philosophers without even bothering to try and understand them, political philosophers of today 
must be trained to embrace both styles and be able to draw sustenance and inspiration from each 
tradition. 
15. The domination of political philosophy by the right 
It has become conventional wisdom that the academy is today dominated by the left. And 
indeed, survey after survey reveals the academy to be overwhelmingly populated by those who 
self-identify as being on the left, especially although not exclusively in the US (see Abrams 2016; 
Kristof 2016; Brandt 2016; Turner 2017; Brooks 2017). But despite the results of these surveys, I 
do not believe that this is true, or rather, to the extent that it is true it is true in a way that is more 
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misleading than it is informative. In my experience and the experience of many of my colleagues 
who have been teaching long enough to remember a different kind of academy, there are important 
aspects of the university that are not addressed in surveys of the political attitudes of its teaching 
personnel. And if we look at these, we find that the academy today is overwhelmingly 
conservative, indeed even corporatist in the internal sense, regardless of whether the university as 
an institution or the majority of its teaching personnel may be left-leaning in an outward sense. By 
this I mean that with regard to its approach to education, its willingness to try out new ideas, its 
suitability as a home to those who are not “organization” men or women (see Whyte 2002), its 
ever greater reliance on highly-paid professional administrators who see themselves as 
“management” and therefore as separate and distinct from the faculty they administer, its emphasis 
on a certain kind of uniformity and its suppression of and reaction to internal dissent, its intolerance 
toward ideas and proposals that are radical but not so clearly unachievable as to be effectively 
harmless, the academy is not liberal at all (see Williams 2013 (reviewing Gross 2013); Newfield 
2017, for similar observations).  
There is also reason to doubt that the traditional categories of left and right continue to 
have the meaning we might once associated with them. Indeed, given the general shift toward the 
extreme right in America and other supposedly liberal democracies too, the right is far more to the 
right than it used to be. Those who at one time would have considered themselves on the moderate 
right are now likely to see themselves as being on the left given how far the right has moved away 
from them. Even traditional conservatives may not feel totally comfortable identifying themselves 
as being on the right today, for while they argue for positions commonly perceived as being on the 
right, they do so from within the framework of political liberalism (see Reiff 2007: 174-5). In 
contrast, the right today is mostly an illiberal and anti-liberal right, a form of perfectionism that 




April 4, 2018  Page 39 
joins Aristotelian and sometimes even Nietzschean moral theory with Platonic political theory and 
neoliberal economic theory (see Lilla 2016: esp. x-xxiI; Heilbrunn 2017; Reiff 2015b: 120-25, 
2017a and b; Holmes 1993). It is not an effort to restore the traditional values of the recent past, 
or an effort to transmit culture across generations because the maintenance of existing values and 
ways of life is perceived as an important good, but an effort to impose values perceived as only 
being fully embraced in a rose-colored version of the ancient world, values that have actually been 
rejected for generations now and whose contemporary embrace would not be conservative but 
radical indeed. The fact that more academics identify themselves as being on the left than used to 
be the case, if this is a fact (see Gravois 2007 for an in-depth discussion of this), is accordingly not 
persuasive evidence that the range of political opinions represented in the academy has actually 
changed, or that it is currently over-weighted toward the “rightward-adjusted” left than it should 
be.  
In any event, even if members of the academy as a whole are now further to the left than 
they used to or should be, this is not true in political philosophy, the discipline that gives the 
concepts of “left” and “right” meaning. Regardless of what has happened to the university as a 
whole, since at least the turn of the century the discipline of political philosophy has become more 
and more conservative, not only in its resistance to change, willingness to encourage and then 
embrace new work, and administrative attitudes, but in its outward political outlook as well. There 
are a number of reasons for this, each of which I shall now discuss. And I shall begin with the 
reason behind so much of the shift to the right in politics lately: the influence of money. 
16. How political philosophy has been influenced by funding from the right 
 
Given the steep drop off in public funding (see Reiff 2014), bringing money into one’s 
department is far more important in the academy today than it used to be. Unfortunately, financial 
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support for political philosophy is raised most easily from the rich, and the rich tend to be on the 
right. Of course, it took some time for those on the right to realize that funding the education of 
those interested in political philosophy rather than simply trying to cut funding for education full 
stop could be an effective tool for advancing their own interests. For example, back in 1949, the 
right libertarian and one of the founding fathers of economic neoliberalism, F. A. Hayek, warned 
that intellectuals and especially philosophers (by which he meant political philosophers) were 
moving the masses toward socialism, or at least toward “progressive” political views, which Hayek 
regarded with what I think can be fairly characterized as unabashed contempt (see Hayek 1949: 
esp. 419, 423-4). While his response was to deny that such intellectuals (except of course, himself) 
had any special claim to wisdom and to assert that the influence of progressive ideas was 
undeserved, attacking the problem that he and others on the right perceived by inciting anti-
intellectualism proved to be an only partially effective strategy (Hofstadter 1962, 1963). Over time, 
however, those on the right realized that a more effective strategy might be to generate intellectuals 
of their own.  
The activist program to influence public concerns and attitudes through the production of 
more and more conservative political philosophers found its most direct expression in what has 
come to be known as “the Powell Memo” (Powell 1971). That document, written in 1971 by Lewis 
F. Powell, then a prominent Richmond, Virginia lawyer who would shortly thereafter be appointed 
by President Nixon to the Supreme Court, set forth what has since been frequently characterized 
as the blueprint for the radical right’s subsequent attack on a wide variety of economic regulations 
and progressive policies and institutions in the United States.23 The memo pitches the civil rights 
movement, the labor movement, the anti-war movement, the environmental movement, and so on 
as all constituting dangerous attempts to undermine “freedom.” And while the memo identifies a 
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number of basic institutions of society as co-conspirators with these movements, the one that 
receives the most attention is education. “College campuses” are described as some of the “most 
disquieting” sources of what is characterized as an “attack” against free enterprise, the rule of law, 
and democracy itself (Powell 1971: 1). As a solution, the memo proposes a multipronged program, 
including the funding of conservative think-tanks and scholars, the vetting and criticism of 
textbooks that are viewed as unfair to conservative viewpoints, the demanding of “equal time” for 
conservative speakers on campus, and perhaps the most important tactic, the “rebalancing’ of 
university faculties to include many more conservative viewpoints (Powell 1971: 15-20). Funding 
for the appropriately conservative “scholarly journals” is also to be provided, as is funding and 
encouragement for the publication of books and articles by conservative scholars more generally 
(Powell 1971: 22-3). Powell’s great insight was accordingly that the political attitudes of American 
academics are not all of equal strategic importance. The attitudes of those teaching courses and 
producing books that are designed to inform and influence the political attitudes of students and 
the general public and provide so-called academic expertise to the government and media matter 
more. To move society to the right, it was not necessary to dominate the academy as a whole, but 
merely to more effectively infiltrate the disciplines dedicated to the analysis and constructive 
formation of these political attitudes, such as political philosophy, wherever it may be occurring. 
And that is what the right and especially the radical right has been doing even since. 
Indeed, aside from being an excellent example of what Richard Hofstadter called “The 
Paranoid Style in American Politics” (Hofstadter 2008), the memo proved to be inspirational to 
the radical right. It “electrified the Right, prompting a new breed of wealthy ultraconservatives to 
weaponize their philanthropic giving in order to fight a multifront war of influence over American 
political thought” (Mayer 2016: 76). It was expressly mentioned by the billionaire Charles Koch 
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(one of the two ultra-conservative Koch brothers) when he helped found the Cato Institute, the 
right-libertarian think tank that has become the mother of numerous other right-libertarian think 
tanks, funds, and organizations also supported by one or both Kochs. Together, these institutions 
fund right-leaning scholars, provide financial assistance to right-leaning students, underwrite the 
dissemination of right-leaning views, publish and republish right-leaning books at subsidized 
prices, and so on. Powell’s memo also inspired Joseph Coors, a supporter of the John Birch 
Society, to become the first donor to the conservative think tank that would become the Heritage 
Foundation, and to support many other conservative organizations as well (see Mayer 2016: 77-8; 
Temin 2017: 17-18). In the wake of the Powell memo, the ultra-conservative Richard Sciafe has 
so far helped bankroll some 133 conservative institutions outside the academy (Mayer 2016:76-
7). And inside the academy, the Koch brothers alone are now funding programs at some 283 four-
year colleges and universities (see Mayer 2016: 171, 363-366; Levinthal 2015; Schulman 2014: 
99). Like-minded donors who do not want their conservative philanthropy to be open to public 
scrutiny can contribute to this effort anonymously through a vehicle the Koch brothers set up called 
“the Donors’ Trust,” or through other established conservative funding conduits like the 
Intercollegiate Studies Institute, the Bradley Foundation, the Sciafe Family Foundation, the David 
Horowitz Freedom Center, the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, and others, all of 
which directly or indirectly support right-leaning academic programs, research centers, institutes, 
or professors or agitate for the greater representation of right-wing ideas in the academy or both.24  
Of course, the institutes, research centers, and professorships set up with money from the 
contemporary right are ostensibly open to political philosophers of all persuasions. But donors 
actually do have an official say over who is being hired and what is being taught in some cases 
(see Levinthal 2014; O’Harrow and Boburg 2017), an unofficial say in others, and in any case can 
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accomplish the same thing by simply funding courses or entire programs of courses that would 
otherwise not be taught and will in practice only attract academics who are sympathetic to the right 
because they have not just right-wing but radical right-wing views effectively embedded in them 
(for example, free-enterprise institutes, Adam Smith centers, libertarian think tanks that are in 
practice dedicated to the promotion of right libertarianism but not left libertarianism, and so on).25 
And while there is nothing wrong with studying a wider range of philosophers of the right (indeed, 
this is essential if students are to understand what is happening in the world today), it is a problem 
if the works of these philosophers are taught uncritically or if this results in philosophers of the 
left not being given the attention that their historical impact indicates they deserve. I leave it to 
each reader to make his or her own judgment about whether certain of their colleagues can be 
characterized as teaching their courses in this way, but there does seem to me to be an unfortunate 
tendency for institutions that host programs funded by the radical right to hire political 
philosophers who are not only right-leaning but also view their role as promoting certain received 
views rather than challenging them or developing new ones. Indeed, I suppose something like this 
attitude is built into the very idea of conservatism, whereas something like its opposite is built into 
liberalism.26 In any event, once hired into these ideologically aligned positions, these philosophers 
then generate a wide range of material designed to support what had been intellectually isolated 
right-wing views, and even more importantly, to reproduce themselves by training PhD students 
to be sympathetic to the right even in its current historically unrepresentative extreme formulation. 
As a result, generations of academics engaged in doing some form of political philosophy, whether 
they be in philosophy, politics, economics, business, or law, have now been shaped or at least 
significantly influenced by the push toward the right that the Powell memo recommended. And 
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this rightward push will no doubt continue if something is not done to counteract it (see Carpenter 
2015; Lipton and Williams 2016; Sessions 2017).  
I realize, of course, that there are left-wing think tanks, research centers, and institutes too. 
But there are not nearly so many as those that have arisen on the right since the issuance of the 
Powell memo, and those that do exist are not nearly so well-funded. Liberal philanthropist George 
Soros, for example, is often named by those on the right as the left-wing version of the Koch 
brothers, and he does give a lot of money to educational institutions. But the overwhelming 
majority of this goes to international or international-focused programs or a university’s general 
fund, and therefore its effect on the formation of political opinions and present and future opinion-
makers within the United States is minimal (see Levinthal 2015). For whatever reason, neither left-
leaning organizations or think tanks nor left-leaning wealthy individuals nor unions have seen fit 
yet to support research centers, academic programs, and professorships of political philosophy in 
comparable numbers to those funded by the right (see Levinthal 2015; Drezner 2017). And even 
when they do, they have not tended to try to influence much less control the ideology behind what 
is being studied and taught. To make matters worse, some of the more left-leaning academic 
research centers that do exist are now being closed under pressure from right-wing boards and/or 
state legislatures (see Carpenter 2015: Moynihan 2017)). There is even a bill under consideration 
in one state’s legislature that would require its public universities to consider political party 
affiliation when hiring new faculty (see Martin 2017), which in light of the claimed liberal bias of 
academia toward the left, is obviously an attempt to institute what can only be seen as affirmative 
action for academics on the right. 
Perhaps this would all be less concerning if those currently in the academy on the left were 
producing more innovative, engaging, and persuasive progressive political philosophy. Regardless 
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of whether they now represent an overwhelming majority or a minority of political philosophers, 
however, most of those on the left are doing nothing more than thinking of yet more ways to tweak 
Rawlsian approach to distributive justice. Even those who embrace luck egalitarianism, the now 
also dated but still most popular alternative to the Rawlsian approach, are merely tweaking their 
views and not proposing anything new.27 If we are to produce a new generation of progressive 
ideas, we accordingly need to take some more proactive steps. And by this I do not mean that 
universities should be encouraged to begin refusing money from the right, although this may 
sometimes be appropriate depending on the strings attached. I mean that universities should at 
least insist on transparency in funding (see Herzog 2018), for sunshine is often an effective 
disinfectant. But most importantly, it is necessary for all concerned parties to start building an 
infrastructure for supporting moderate right and left-leaning political philosophy that is more 
comparable to the infrastructure that the radical right has already successfully established and 
which is now dominating the generation of political philosophy and political philosophers. 
17. Answering the charge of liberal bias  
 
Of course, even if we ignore the changes initiated by the Powell memo—that is, even if we 
assume that conservatives are actually underrepresented among political philosophers in the 
academy today given their significance in the intellectual cannon and in history, this does not mean 
that conservative ideas are necessarily underrepresented, or that liberal faculty are so intellectually 
biased that they are incapable of teaching conservative ideas as well as liberal ones and of 
mentoring students who find conservative ideas attractive or already identify as being on the right. 
The argument that they cannot is to resort to the argument that only people who belong to a certain 
group can understand its beliefs or represent its interests, an idea that the right has been disparaging 
for years whenever it is made by those on the left. But academics have a long and proud traditional 
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of teaching ideas with which they disagree. Why should we assume that those on the moderate 
left, which (unlike the current immoderate right) expressly embraces toleration as a fundamental 
value, are incapable of treating conservative or ultra-conservative faculty or students or their ideas 
with the requisite degree of respect? There may of course be individuals who fail to live up to their 
duties in this sense, and those who self-identify as being on the current right do constantly 
complain that they are treated with disrespect by their universities and departments, although there 
is also some conservative pushback on this (see Heath 2017). But there is no non-anecdotal 
empirical evidence that there is any systematic bias against conservative ideas or the persons who 
promote them on university campuses today.  
Nor is the anecdotal evidence often cited by those on the right as suggesting a lack of 
tolerance for conservatives and their ideas on campus as concerning as they claim. Most of this 
relates to conservative persons and ideas that are so extreme they are more properly categorized 
as belonging to the far right, or the radical right, or as it is often misleadingly described today, the 
“alt-right.” More traditional conservative individuals—those who trace their intellectual lineage to 
thinkers like Edmund Burke and Michael Oakeshott and who argue for their positions within the 
moral framework provided by fundamental presuppositions of political liberalism, do not seem to 
be complaining (see Abrams 2017). For the most part, those who are complaining reject the idea 
that modern society should provide room for both the moderate right and the moderate left to 
operate. Instead, they hope to create a society in which everyone is required to embrace a very 
specific set of (often extreme but always comprehensive and prescriptive) social and political 
views (see Caiolo 2017; Kopetmen, Bharath, Schwebke, and Robinson 2017; Hartocollis 2017; 
Beckett 2017). These more extreme ideas should indeed be discussed on campus—it is important 
that students be exposed to them in an ordered and contextualized manner and that research 
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continue to be done on them so that the influence and the danger they represent can be better 
understood. But as Rawls noted long ago, it is not unjust to be intolerant of persons who personally 
embrace these ideas, for if given the chance they would suppress those who disagree (see Rawls 
1971, 1999: 192). Indeed, it would be absurd not to mention self-defeating if the big tent of 
academia was to be considered appropriately inclusive only if it included those who would kick 
everyone else out. The existence of “doctrines that reject one or more democratic freedoms is itself 
a permanent fact of life, or seems so,” but under political liberalism, such views are unreasonable 
and therefore must be contained, Rawls warns us, “like war and disease—so that they do not 
overturn political justice” (Rawls 1993, 1996, 2005: 63-4 n. 19). In other words, liberalism is not 
just about permissiveness; liberalism has teeth, and it not improper for it to bear them sometimes. 
And Rawls is not alone in maintaining such a view—T. M. Scanlon also argues that it is not 
intolerant to not tolerate the intolerant, nor espouse tolerance as official doctrine, nor deny the 
intolerant the opportunity that others have to state their views (see Scanlon 2003: 196-7). Many 
others argue similarly as well (see, e.g., Popper 2013: 581 n. 4). And while much more needs to 
be said about how to distinguish unreasonable views that are not worthy of toleration from 
reasonable ones that are, the difficulty presented by such line-drawing and the partial 
indeterminacy that will inevitably remain does not render the core moral conclusion here invalid. 
No institution within a liberal society is required to tolerate those who seek to undermine the very 
basis of liberalism’s existence, and while they may do so when the intolerant do not represent a 
threat to the moral framework that liberalism erects, and in any case the response to intolerance 
must always be proportional to the threat presented, in the present context, the threat is abundantly 
clear.  
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Finally, even if we were to find the anecdotal evidence of the intolerance of certain extreme 
conservative viewpoints within academia disturbing and concerning, the weight of such evidence 
currently suggests that the more worrisome pressure on academics today is actually coming from 
the right. Obviously, this suggestion runs counter to the claim usually expressed by those on the 
right as the problem of oppressive “political correctness” (see, e.g., Pérez-Peña, Smith, and Saul 
2016),28 and I am not denying that views on the right as well as on the left are sometimes 
inappropriately suppressed on campuses today (see Hartocollis 2016). But there is no left-wing 
version of the Professors Watchlist, a list of university teaching personnel who are supposedly 
expressly biased against the right (see Mele 2016; Butler 2016). Death threats are made mostly 
against those perceived as being on the left, trolling attacks as well, so it is right-wing bullying of 
faculty who are perceived as being on the left that seems the most intense (see, e.g., Palumbo-Liu 
2018; Lieberman 2017; Mann 2016). At the very least, the limited anecdotal evidence of the 
practice of unjustified or excessive intolerance on the left is no more extensive than the anecdotal 
evidence of such conduct on the right.  
18. The misapplication of the principle of neutrality  
In addition to the influence of right-wing money and the resulting over-representation of 
right-wing personnel and the over-promotion of right-wing ideas, the development and 
transmission of progressive ideas in political philosophy is also being hampered today by a 
misapplication of the principle of neutrality. This is the idea that in a liberal society, government 
should remain neutral between competing comprehensive moral doctrines, conceptions of the 
good, and ways of life—that is, not officially favor or support one or some collection of views 
over others (see Reiff 2007:178-9). Unfortunately, in the academy, this principle has been 
incorrectly assumed to require never openly taking a stand on any contemporary controversial 
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issue currently subject to political debate (see Marneffe 2002). Faculty not only feel pressured to 
keep their opinions to themselves, whatever these may be, they often pressure themselves not to 
reveal their own opinions thinking that this is what they must do to appear neutral to their students. 
This is especially problematic because this attitude is found mostly on the left and successfully 
applied mostly to those on the left as well. Those on the anti-liberal right, after all, do not believe 
in the principle of neutrality—indeed, there is long intellectual tradition now of arguing that the 
liberal commitment to neutrality leaves it unable to stand up for its own beliefs (see, e.g., Schmitt 
1996: 70; Strauss 1953: 4-5), although this has not stopped those on the right from accusing those 
on the left of lacking neutrality.29 And it is true that under liberalism, government neutrality is 
believed to be fundamental because it allows if not produces value pluralism, which in turn is 
viewed as the hallmark of a liberal society. But values have to come from somewhere, and if they 
are not going to be imposed by the government under liberalism then educational institutions, be 
they public or private, along with religious institutions, the family, and culture are the places from 
whence they must come. Indeed, the university may be the most important value-imparting 
institution on this list, for it is the only one that can be counted on to make a systematic presentation 
of a wide range of sets of values rather than just one. While it would be a violation of neutrality 
for government to direct university professors to express a specified view, or to prohibit them from 
expressing a specified view, it is essential that professors be allowed to express their own view if 
they are to both inform their students “what is out there” in terms of substantive values and assist 
them in developing their own reasonable comprehensive moral and political doctrines and 
conceptions of the good (see De-Shalit 2005).  
But this does not mean I am suggesting that political philosophy professors on the left 
should strive to become partisan shills. It is of course true that one way to be persuasive is to 
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present your opponent’s position in a distorted, unflattering light, or perhaps not even make clear 
that there is an opposing view. That is what I am accusing those on the currently immoderate right 
of being too inclined to do. But one can have opinions, make clear what those opinions are, and 
still present all sides of a debate in their best possible light. In other words, we can have neutrality 
in presentation without insisting on the neutrality of the presenter. And this is all the principle of 
neutrality requires. The sooner the left learns to recognize this the sooner its self-destructive 
tendency to suppress its own and support the other in the name of proving its neutrality the quicker 
some progress can be made.  
19.  The political philosopher as role model 
Some respected philosophers nevertheless believe that university professors should keep 
their opinions on “political” matters to themselves for a different reason—they believe that the 
opinions of such people (but not, apparently, themselves) on such matters are worth no more than 
the opinions of anybody else (see, e.g., Fish 2016). In other words, they are openly hostile to the 
idea of claimed “expertise” in any area where ordinary people are capable of forming reasoned 
opinions of their own (see Nicholas 2017). Not that this is an unreasonable position in other 
contexts. Such a thought is enshrined in American law with regard to what subjects may be the 
subject of expert testimony before a jury—only issues that are so outside the normal range of 
experience that some sort of specialized technical knowledge is required to understand them may 
be the subject of such testimony (see, e.g., Rule 702, Federal Rules of Evidence). I suppose that 
what is driving this concern is a desire to prevent the erosion of autonomy—if we give more weight 
to the opinions of so-called experts than to our own on subjects we are capable as analyzing 
ourselves we will be effectively delegating the formation of essential portions of our belief set and 
our corresponding reasons for action to others. But there is nothing about recognizing that the well-
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informed and well-reasoned opinion of others is an important resource in deciding what we each 
should do or believe that means we are implicitly giving up our responsibility for making these 
key decisions in our own lives. The loss of autonomy concern here is simply overstated.  
Indeed, it is especially important that we know the opinions of professors who are 
supposedly trained in analyzing the issues on which they speak, even if we are capable of coming 
to reasoned opinions on these ourselves without such assistance. First, because all political 
philosophers have views about what they discuss (if they do not they have no right to call 
themselves political philosophers), so if professors disguise their personal views, this is deceitful, 
and insisting that professors be deceitful is inconsistent with and undermining of every other aspect 
of their mission. Second, because there is no reason to think it would be better for professors to 
conceal their views when this only makes it more difficult for students to evaluate the neutrality 
of the presentation, even if we assume that such attempts at concealment would be successful—
something which there is also good reason to doubt.30 And finally (and most importantly), under 
liberalism it is important for students to see professors of political philosophy as role models. What 
I mean by this is that if a student respects the argumentative rigor and analysis of a particular 
professor, the student is more likely to take the fact that this professor endorses a certain view as 
a reason to take that view seriously. Correspondingly, it a student finds a particular professor’s 
intellectual discipline lax, the student is more likely to find the fact this professor endorses a certain 
view as a reason to be wary of it. This is simply human nature. The professor is a natural role 
model (either to model oneself after or to model oneself against) whether anyone likes it or not. It 
is self-defeating to deny this important aspect of university education by discouraging academics 
from making their own views known, especially in a discipline like political philosophy which 
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exists only in the academy. For if academics do not make their own views clear, there are no other 
role models in political philosophy available. 
20. Political philosophy at the elite private institution 
In the United States, unlike most other liberal capitalist countries, a large percentage of our 
elite universities are privately funded. Obtaining an education at one of these private institutions 
is very expensive and, even when generous scholarships are available, the children of the wealthy 
still have a striking advantage in admission (see Reardon, Baker, and Klasik 2012; Bailey and 
Dynarski 2011; Aisch, Buchanan, Cox, and Quealy 2017). Of course, tuition at our public 
universities is rising too, and this is a serious problem that needs to be addressed, but this is a 
matter best discussed elsewhere.31 My point here is that because the profession tends to be led by 
work being generated by those teaching at elite institutions, and because most of these in the US 
are private, we must consider whether the way our higher education system is organized and 
funded has unintended but important effects on the development of the discipline of political 
philosophy.  
I think it does. One of the major topics of interest among political philosophers is the 
distribution of wealth, income, and opportunities and the problems that the unequal distribution of 
these resources can cause or perpetuate in our society. One such inequality, of course, is that there 
tends to be a vast difference in the resources available at private as compared to public educational 
institutions. As a result, those who teach at private institutions tend to get more research leave, 
have to teach fewer courses, and have more access to research support than those at public 
institutions. And it is difficult to rail against privilege and the undeserved benefits this may convey 
when one is in the midst of privilege and in receipt of those benefits oneself. It is especially difficult 
to do this before an audience composed mostly of privileged students. Indeed, I cannot believe that 
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philosophers of the left will not lose their edge within elite private institution, even if they manage 
not to be completely co-opted or seduced into quietude by the wealth and privilege they find around 
them. Throughout history, left-leaning political philosophy has been most vibrant and credible 
when it takes place in difficult surroundings, in buildings where one sticks to the floor, not in those 
that are so grand and sterile that one can eat off of it. It is probably no accident that the most active 
philosophers on the left (and especially the far left) are currently based in European (public) 
universities, while the most active philosophers of the right are based in the United States. Much 
as I like the comfort, resources, and high-quality students available at elite US private institutions, 
I am afraid we must recognize that the way our higher education system is funded here has an 
inevitable dampening effect on the amount, type, and vigor of high-profile work being generated 
by left-leaning political philosophers.  
Not that I am suggesting those on the left should refuse to teach at such institutions—
obviously, teaching at such institutions increases one’s prestige and the profile of one’s work, and 
it is important for the students at such institutions to be exposed to more progressive ideas given 
that they are more likely than their public university counterparts to be become leading figures in 
government, business, and perhaps even culture. And in the current economic environment, few 
academics have the luxury of being picky about where they teach. But more has to be done to by 
the left to bring political philosophy and important political philosophers to the public university, 
where they are not mostly teaching the children of the existing elite. I recognize that in public 
universities, political philosophers need to be protected from right-wing legislatures that would try 
to directly suppress their work (see Purdy 2015), but attempts at direct suppression can be made 
at private universities too. In any event, it is easier to fight direct suppression than the subtle 
seduction of co-option, for in the latter case there is no easily identifiable aggressor to address. 
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21. Why it is so difficult to break from the past 
I have one final thought on why we are seeing so little original, vivacious, relevant primary 
political philosophy being produced today, on either the left or the right. We are moving into a 
period where a generation of great political philosophers—those who made significant primary 
contributions to contemporary political philosophy, like John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Robert 
Nozick, Brian Barry, G. A. Cohen, and so on have died and those remaining are becoming silent 
due to age. The profession is now in the control of their students or, in more and more cases, in 
the control of the students of their students. Such people naturally tend to view their role as carrying 
the message of those who inspired them forward into the future rather than blazing a new path 
themselves and indeed, the theories of the last previous generation of great political philosophers 
still overwhelmingly dominate the subject matter of current work. This is not to suggest that the 
work of these greats does not deserve continuing study, explication, and refinement. But at some 
point, greats cast as much shadow as they do light. The students of great primary political 
philosophers and their students were no doubt great students, and some may have even become 
great secondary political philosophers, writing insightfully about their mentors, but the students of 
greats and the students of their students rarely turn out to be great primary political philosophers 
themselves, even in the unlikely event they do produce some primary material. As the greats pass 
on, the profession accordingly becomes ossified in their wake. Indeed, it is no accident that the 
most recent burst of advancement in political theory—the one that began with Rawls—came at a 
time when political philosophy was thought to be dead and no one then writing felt much a personal 
connection with those viewed as the greats of the past.  
What can be done about this? Must we wait for enough time to go by that no one feels 
much of a connection to this last generation of greats anymore? I hope not. What is required to get 
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things moving again is striking new thinking from what will turn out to be a new generation of 
greats. But innovation in political philosophy rarely attracts consensus, especially when it comes 
from unconventional places, which it most often does. Indeed, genius most often comes out of 
nowhere. So how we are going to recognize who might be among the next generation of greats? 
Well, the most important thing when searching for new ideas is to get out of their way—by that I 
mean that we need to be a lot less concerned with pedigree and position than we currently are and 
a lot more generous in our willingness to entertain new theories that come from outside of what 
has become for many of us a hermetically sealed and stultifying intellectual bubble. Students can 
in fact be of great help to us here—they have little intellectual investment in existing theories, so 
are naturally more willing and able to recognize something as intriguing when it comes along 
wherever it might come from. If we just listen to our students—not as a source of new ideas 
themselves (although of course we should be listening for this too), but as a guide toward the “new 
music” of political philosophy, we might just be able to hear the future coming.32  
Notes 
 
 1 Berlin asked, “is there still such a subject as political theory” given that “no commanding 
work of political philosophy has appeared in the twentieth century” (Berlin 1978). See also 
Plamenatz 1960 (discussing whether political philosophy was indeed dead).  
 2 Brian Barry began to worry that this was happening as long ago as 1979. See Barry 1980: 
283-284. 
 3 This was not always so. See, for example, the frequent use of humor in Nozick’s Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia (Nozick 1974), which is no doubt one of the reasons why it is so appealing and 
has become so influential, and the frequent use of striking metaphors and strong language 
throughout J. M. Keynes’s work, which has also been hugely influential. 
 4 Closer to home, Stanley Fish makes a similar point in Fish 1989a. 
 5 Note that attempts to summarize the field in just a single sentence are rare. Even attempts 
at more comprehensive descriptions are uncommon. For one of the better versions of the latter, 
upon which I shall draw in a moment, see Rawls 2007. The most illuminating and succinct portion 
of this discussion appears on pages 10-11 as section 2. A slightly expanded version of this 
particular section of the discussion also appears in Rawls 2001 as section 1. The most famous 
attempt at describing the field, however, is probably the essay “What is Political Philosophy?” by 
Leo Strauss (see Strauss 1959). Despite being almost 50 pages long, however, I find this piece 
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distinctly unilluminating. A somewhat more illuminating and significantly shorter effort can be 
found in Raphael 1990. 
 6 See Nozick 1974: 6 (“moral philosophy sets the background for, and boundaries of political 
philosophy. What persons may or may not do to one another limits what they may do through the 
apparatus of the state, or do to establish such an apparatus. The moral prohibitions it is permissible 
to enforce are the source of whatever legitimacy the state’s fundamental coercive power has”); 
Norman 1998: 279, (“Political Philosophy for methodological Rawlsians, and just about everyone 
else, is commonly taken to be a branch of moral philosophy”); and Strauss 1959: 10-12. A long 
discussion of this point is also set forth in Kymlicka 2002: 5-7. 
 7 For a discussion of both views and reference to some of their respective adherents, see 
Larmore 2013. Note that Larmore himself ultimately concludes that political philosophy cannot 
address the characteristic problems of political life “except by reference to moral principles 
understood as having an antecedent validity.” So while Larmore also argues that political 
philosophy should be considered an autonomous discipline, whatever that is supposed to mean in 
this context, his assertion is more semantic than substantive, for he concedes that political 
philosophy necessarily contains a moral element, which is the only point I am making here. 
 8 Berlin again: “I think that political theory is simply ethics applied to society, to public issues, 
to relations of power, that and nothing else. Some people think that political theory is simply about 
the nature of power; I don’t think that. I think that political theory is about the ends of life, about 
values, about the goals of social existence, about what men in society live by and should live by, 
about good and evil, right and wrong. Neutral analysis of the facts of public life is sociology or 
political science, not political theory or philosophy.” From Jahanbegloo 2007: 57-58. 
 9 The phrase “secular stagnation” actually comes from Larry Summers (see DeLong 2013). 
 10 For a similar argument against the primacy of empiricism, albeit in a somewhat different 
context, see Oakeshott 1975. 
 11 In this section I draw in part but expand on Elster 1989: 1-3. 
 12 See Elster 1982: 230: “[Nozick’s] Anarchy, State, and Utopia is the best-known statement 
of libertarian thought. Brilliant and frivolous, it generates excitement, provocation, and irritation 
in equal measures . . . [but] it does not take a careful reading to see that it has virtually no 
implications for policy.” 
 13 See also Biggle and Frodeman 2016: “Philosophers have mimicked scientists in all the worst 
ways: practicing a highly specialized discipline and speaking primarily to one another.”  
 14 In personal conversation with the author.  
 15 C. Wright Mills, who began to worry about this in his own discipline (sociology) some time 
ago, calls this the “bureaucratization” of the academy. See Mills 1959.  
 16 For an answer to Mason’s question, see Farrelly 2007. See also Cohen 2003. 
 17 For those interested in perusing some of the existing literature on these issues, see, e.g., Gaus 
2016; Valentini, 2009, and the entire issue of Social Theory and Practice 34:3 (2008), which is 
devoted exclusively to a discussion of the ideal/non-ideal debate, especially Stemplowska 2008 
and Robeyns 2008.  
 18 For some criticism of this turn toward mathematization, see, e.g., Krugman 2009; 
Levinovitz, 2016.  
 19 See, for example, Moore 2011: 125: “Based on the survey, it is clear that political theory is 
treated as being not essential to political science in a disturbingly large proportion of political 
science departments.” My own experience suggests the same is true of philosophy departments.  
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 20 See Dowding 2018: 250: “Given that emotion is always part of our reasoning process, and 
given acknowledgement that our emotions ought to be engaged in our deliberative assessments, 
we cannot always assume that we are being manipulated simply because our emotions are 
engaged.”  
 21 For a discussion of the fundamental presuppositions of liberalism and how these differs from 
various perfectionist viewpoints on both the extreme left and the extreme right, see Reiff 2007.  
 22 See also Kramer 1999: 166. 
 23 For a discussion of the role the Powell memo played in re-activating the radical right in the 
1970s, see Mayer 2016: 72-91; Phillips-Fein 2009: 156-165; MacLean 2017: 125-126. See also 
Schmitt 2005. Note, however, that while Schmitt questions whether the Powell’s memo sets forth 
an influential statement of conservatism, this attempt to diminish the importance of the Powell 
memo misses the point. Powell’s memo is not intended as an ideological defense of conservatism; 
Powell just takes conservative ideas as given. What the memo does is set forth a game plan for 
opposing liberalism, undermining its influence in American society, creating and supporting 
competing conservative institutions, and replacing those with liberal ideas in existing institutions 
with more sympathetic free marketeers wherever possible. It is as a plan of action, not an 
intellectual statement, that it has been incredibly influential. 
 24 See Sleeper 2016; Scheiber 2017 (“Like the Kochs, the DeVoses are generous supporters of 
think tanks that evangelize for unrestrained capitalism”); Coaston 2017) (describing the influence 
of the ISI). 
 25 See, e.g., MacLean 2017: esp. ch. 3; Schuessler 2017 (describing the political influence of 
the right-wing funded Claremont Institute and the Claremont Review of Books); Platt 2016 
(Charles Koch Foundation plus two anonymous donors provide funding for 11 new faculty 
members, up to five post-doctoral researchers, and an annual conference or workshop); Schalin 
2015. Note that the Pope Center, at which Schalin is based, is itself a celebration of attempts to 
move the academy to the right. The Center is a conservative think tank founded and funded largely 
by Art Pope, the wealthy chairman and C.E.O. of Variety Wholesalers, a discount-store 
conglomerate, whose money helped flip the North Carolina legislature to the Republicans in 2010 
and who also bankrolled the 2012 election of Republican Governor Pat McCrory (see Purdy 2015; 
Mayer 2011). Pope has also funded a number of other think tanks and research centers, and at one-
time was the chair of the national board of Americans for Prosperity, the Tea-Party group founded 
and heavily funded by Charles and David Koch (see Carpenter 2015). 
 26 Something like this observation is made the basis of the argument presented in Cholbi 2014.  
 27 I suppose I should also mention here the movement for universal basic income (see Van 
Parijs and Vanderborght 2017), which is finally getting some traction now after languishing in 
obscurity for decades. Despite being heavily promoted by some on the left, however, it is actually 
based on a right-wing proposal from the 1960s (see Friedman 1968). And while its advocates see 
this as a strategic advantage, I do not think this means that it can be considered an example of new 
progressive thinking, even if its adoption in its liberal form were not entirely politically infeasible. 
In the US, at least, the only way it could actually have a widespread impact is if it were reclaimed 
by the right and used to justify the elimination of all sorts of existing government assistance to the 
poor.  
 28 For a thoughtful defense of political correctness, see Owen 2016. 
 29 The thinking here, I suppose, is that the left is to be judged in part by its compliance with its 
own standards, even if the right rejects them. It is also, no doubt, a way of “working the refs,” a 
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way of intimidating the left so that it will be overly solicitous to the right so as disprove even 
unfounded claims of bias (see Krugman 2016). 
 30 See Kelly-Woessner and Woessner 2006: 496 (almost 90% of students surveyed felt 
confident they were able to identify their professor’s political leanings even if the professor did 
not make those leanings explicit).  
 31 For one possible solution to this problem, see Reiff 2014. 
 32 My thanks to Harriet Davidson, Lisa Herzog, Ben Kotzee, Matthew Kramer, Nigel 
Simmonds, Hillel Steiner, and an anonymous referee for this journal, all of who provided important 
input, comments, and suggestions, sometimes in discussion and sometimes in writing, that led to 
significant improvements in my argument, and to all my past, present, and future students in 
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